LilacSat-2 – Linux Live CD for Telemetry Decoding

LilacSat-2 (CAS-3H) was launched along with eight other XW-2/CAS-3 amateur radio satellites on Saturday 19 September 2015 at 23:01:14 UT 

During the first 16 hours in orbit, we have received nearly 1000 packets of LilacSat-2 from Harbin (BY2HIT), Shihezi (B0/BY2HIT), Nanjing (BI4ST), Xian (Northwestern Polytechnical University) and Singapore (9V1SV). Many thank to all!
— WEI Mingchuan, BG2BHC

Linux LiveCD for telemetry decoding released. Downloaded -  http://pan.baidu.com/s/1eQfNsGE

Now we have support for FCDPP, USRP and RTL-SDR. Not hard to edit the GRC flowcharts to support other devices.

It can be burned into a USB stick to boot a computer directly, run from a virtual machine or installed into a hard disk.

User manual also included.

Further LilacSat-2 Details -  http://lilacsat.hit.edu.cn/

Do not Digipeat via PCSAT

The PCSAT spacecraft, launched over fourteen years ago and has, due to an on-board power system issue, started to transmit APRS on 144.390 MHz 

Although this is the correct frequency for APRS operation in IARU Region 2, it is not compatible within the Region 1 bandplan which has this part of the band designated for weak signal and particularly Meteor Scatter operation.

The orbit of this spacecraft means that sometimes it is in full sunlight and, at other times, it is eclipsed for a major percentage of the orbit. As the on-board batteries have lost their ability to hold a charge, the problem can only occur when it is in sunlight.

Various methods to mitigate this problem are presently under active consideration but in the meantime it is important that no amateur / ham radio operator in Region 1 should attempt to digipeat through this spacecraft. Additionally Ham Radio Operators on the east coast of the American continent are also requested not to attempt to activate the spacecraft when it can be “seen” from Europe.

At IARU level, further work is being undertaken to reduce the risk from future spacecraft potentially causing similar problems. Such problems could result from developers not following the globally agreed band plans for amateur satellite operations.

In particular the IARU Satellite Coordinator has been requested to make urgent contact with the team responsible for XW-2(CAS-3) mission of nine satellites from China. Some of the proposed frequencies do not respect the internationally agreed Region 1 Bandplan for 2 metres.

Low Cost Device lets Hackers Hijack Satellite and Amateur Radio Satellite Communications

Satellite tracking technology can be easily hacked with the help of a $1,000 device made of off the shelf components, according to a security researcher who found a flaw in the technology.

Taking advantage of this flaw, criminal hackers could track and hijack valuable cargo, such as military supplies or cash and gold stored in an armored car, according to Colby Moore, a researcher at security firm Synack, who plans to show off his findings at the upcoming Black Hat security conference.

Moore claims that the communications between trackers sold by GlobalStar and its constellation of satellites is insecure, allowing pretty much anyone to intercept it and even send its own spoofed signal to the satellites. This flaw, according to Moore, shows that satellite companies like GlobalStar aren’t taking basic steps to make their technologies secure.

“We’re only at the tip of the iceberg for the implications around this. It’s really critical that these companies start taking security seriously. It’s really critical that these companies start taking security seriously.” - Colby Moore

GlobalStar markets its satellite tracking devices to corporations and government agencies that want to track their valuable assets. They can also be used to monitor industrial critical infrastructure such as pipelines, or to track hikers and other adventurers who use GlobalStar’s consumer tracker called “Spot.”

All these devices, according to Moore, depend on the same, flawed technology, known as the Simplex data network, which is used to send data between the transmitters and the satellites.

More said he was able to reverse engineer the protocol underlying the network and find that all these devices use the same code to transmit data, making it “very easy’ to intercept data flowing from the devices to the satellites.

Full story -
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/this-1000-device-lets-hackers-hijack-satellite-communications